* Squashed commits
- WIP: uncommitted changes before rebase
- ci
- Show inline PR check details in task drawer
- Add a Checks tab that opens from the PR checks cell and expands runs inline
- Fetch check output, annotations, and workflow job steps through IPC/RPC
- Improve markdown/comment wrapping so long PR content stays within the drawer
* Use app-styled confirmations for PR actions (#2324)
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix: pr-bug-scan validated finding from #2274 (#2296)
Co-authored-by: orca-bug-scan-bot <orca-bug-scan-bot@stably.ai>
* fix: avoid optional git locks during status checks
---------
Co-authored-by: Jinwoo Hong <73622457+Jinwoo-H@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
Co-authored-by: buf0-bot[bot] <252831055+buf0-bot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: orca-bug-scan-bot <orca-bug-scan-bot@stably.ai>
When a remote SSH workspace contains a symlink whose target lies outside
the registered repo/worktree roots, file reads failed with 'Path outside
authorized workspace'. This silently broke common workflows: HPC dataset
mounts, multi-checkout repos, dotfile editing, and any cross-mount
symlink.
Drop `RelayContext.authorizedRoots`, `validatePath`, and
`validatePathResolved` along with all ~33 call sites in fs-handler.ts
and git-handler.ts. The relay's threat model becomes 'the relay runs as
the SSH user and trusts the renderer.'
Why this is acceptable: `pty.spawn` and `git.exec` already concede the
same threat. A renderer that wants to reach `/etc/passwd` can spawn a
shell or run `git -C /etc cat-file`; the FS allowlist was friction, not
a security boundary. Intra-worktree path checks in `getDiff` and
`discard` are intentionally preserved.
Back-compat preserved: `session.registerRoot` (notification + request)
remains a valid RPC, retained as no-ops on new relays. Old main + new
relay and new main + old relay both keep working through the upgrade
window. `registerRelayRoots` is also kept for the same reason. A
narrowed error-translation block in `worktree-remote.ts` handles old
relays still surfacing the legacy error string to users.
Tests: removed two negative-allowlist tests; added a positive control
('reads files outside any registered root') and a direct regression
test for #1661 ('reads files via symlinks resolving outside the
workspace'). All 469 relay/SSH/IPC tests pass.
See docs/relay-fs-allowlist-removal.md for the full rationale,
back-compat matrix, alternatives considered, and follow-up cleanup
plan.
Closes#1661
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>