Igor Lins e Silva
afd0428823
* feat(serve): turnkey secure remote MCP server (#1877) Add `mempalace serve`: a secure-by-default wrapper over the HTTP MCP transport so a team can stand up a shared central palace with one command. Server capabilities (mempalace/mcp_server.py): - Native TLS via --tls-cert/--tls-key (env MEMPALACE_MCP_TLS_CERT/_KEY): wraps the socket in a TLS 1.2+ context, validated before bind. Token is still required on a non-loopback bind (TLS != auth). - Read-only mode via --read-only (env MEMPALACE_MCP_READ_ONLY): the 24 mutating tools are hidden from tools/list and refused at dispatch (-32003), enforced before arg handling — not merely hidden. Turnkey command (mempalace/cli.py): - Auto-generates a strong bearer token for non-loopback binds, stored 0600 under ~/.mempalace/server/ and printed once; reused across restarts. Token rides in the child env, never argv, so it can't leak via ps. - Prints a ready-to-paste client config (scheme reflects TLS), then foreground-execs the real server so Docker/systemd own the lifecycle. Deployment (deploy/): - docker-compose.server.yml wires the server + Qdrant with a /healthz healthcheck and persistent volumes. - server.env.example documents the env surface. - mempalace-server.service is a hardened systemd unit template. Tests: TLS handshake (openssl-gated), read-only enforcement, token autogen/0600/reuse, token-not-in-argv, secure-by-default gates. Docs: remote-server guide now leads with `mempalace serve` plus Compose and systemd subsections. * test(serve): fix Windows — don't patch os.name; gate 0600 asserts to POSIX Patching os.name to 'posix' broke Path.home() on Windows (pathlib mixed POSIX home resolution with Windows drive parsing). Capture both exec branches (os.execve + subprocess.run) instead, and guard the POSIX permission-bit assertions behind os.name == 'posix' (Windows files report 0o666).
49 lines
1.7 KiB
Desktop File
49 lines
1.7 KiB
Desktop File
# MemPalace remote MCP server — systemd unit template.
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#
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# Install:
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# sudo useradd --system --home /var/lib/mempalace --shell /usr/sbin/nologin mempalace
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# sudo install -d -o mempalace -g mempalace -m 750 /var/lib/mempalace /etc/mempalace
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# sudo cp deploy/server.env.example /etc/mempalace/server.env # then edit + chmod 600
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# sudo install -m 600 -o mempalace -g mempalace /etc/mempalace/server.env /etc/mempalace/server.env
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# # install mempalace into a venv on PATH, or adjust ExecStart to its absolute path
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# sudo cp deploy/mempalace-server.service /etc/systemd/system/
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# sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now mempalace-server
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#
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# This binds 0.0.0.0:8765 and requires MEMPALACE_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN (set in the
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# EnvironmentFile). Front it with a TLS-terminating reverse proxy, or set
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# MEMPALACE_MCP_TLS_CERT / _KEY in the EnvironmentFile for native TLS.
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[Unit]
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Description=MemPalace remote MCP server
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After=network-online.target
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Wants=network-online.target
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[Service]
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Type=exec
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User=mempalace
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Group=mempalace
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EnvironmentFile=/etc/mempalace/server.env
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ExecStart=mempalace serve --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8765
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Restart=on-failure
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RestartSec=2
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# --- Hardening ---------------------------------------------------------------
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NoNewPrivileges=true
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ProtectSystem=strict
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ProtectHome=true
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PrivateTmp=true
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PrivateDevices=true
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ProtectKernelTunables=true
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ProtectKernelModules=true
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ProtectControlGroups=true
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
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RestrictNamespaces=true
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LockPersonality=true
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MemoryDenyWriteExecute=false
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# The palace and any local state live here; everything else is read-only.
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ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/mempalace
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StateDirectory=mempalace
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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