Bump package, plugins, lock, and README badge to 3.7.0. Promote the
post-3.6.0 integrity spine into CHANGELOG: single-writer ownership,
HNSW write defaults and preflight, safer repair/re-mine, MCP/daemon
lifecycle hardening, entity ReDoS guard, and hook write-routing.
Also ruff-format two test files that drifted during conflict merges.
Local validation: ruff check/format clean; 3497 passed, 31 skipped.
Read-only gated on _MUTATING_TOOLS, which is the palace-write set the
peer-writer lease consults to decide which calls need the palace mine
lock. Two tools change state without touching the palace, so they are
correctly absent from that set and were served on a --read-only server
anyway: mempalace_hook_settings rewrites ~/.mempalace/config.json via
MempalaceConfig.set_hook_setting, and mempalace_memories_filed_away
unlinks ~/.mempalace/hook_state/last_checkpoint on both branches.
Add _READ_ONLY_REFUSED_TOOLS and point the dispatch gate and the
tools/list filter at it. _MUTATING_TOOLS and the peer-writer path are
unchanged: adding the two names there instead would put a config-only
tool under the palace lease, so a server that lost the lease to a peer
would answer -32001 for a call the lease has no say over.
mempalace_reconnect stays reachable on purpose and the comment records
why, since clearing ChromaBackend._quarantined_paths lets the reopen
rename a segment directory. The two --read-only help strings and the
matching row in the remote-server guide said "the mutating tools",
which now names the narrower set.
On the HTTP transport, a client that hangs up mid-response makes the send
path raise an unhandled BrokenPipeError / ConnectionResetError, so the
default socketserver handle_error logs a full traceback for a routine
disconnect. Override handle_error on the HTTP server to log the disconnect
(ConnectionError, plus ssl.SSLEOFError over TLS) at DEBUG and drop it, while
every other exception still reaches the default handler with its traceback.
The wider ssl.SSLError tree is left uncaught, so genuine TLS handshake/cert
failures still surface.
Addresses the disconnect half of #2003.
* feat(serve): turnkey secure remote MCP server (#1877)
Add `mempalace serve`: a secure-by-default wrapper over the HTTP MCP
transport so a team can stand up a shared central palace with one
command.
Server capabilities (mempalace/mcp_server.py):
- Native TLS via --tls-cert/--tls-key (env MEMPALACE_MCP_TLS_CERT/_KEY):
wraps the socket in a TLS 1.2+ context, validated before bind. Token
is still required on a non-loopback bind (TLS != auth).
- Read-only mode via --read-only (env MEMPALACE_MCP_READ_ONLY): the 24
mutating tools are hidden from tools/list and refused at dispatch
(-32003), enforced before arg handling — not merely hidden.
Turnkey command (mempalace/cli.py):
- Auto-generates a strong bearer token for non-loopback binds, stored
0600 under ~/.mempalace/server/ and printed once; reused across
restarts. Token rides in the child env, never argv, so it can't leak
via ps.
- Prints a ready-to-paste client config (scheme reflects TLS), then
foreground-execs the real server so Docker/systemd own the lifecycle.
Deployment (deploy/):
- docker-compose.server.yml wires the server + Qdrant with a /healthz
healthcheck and persistent volumes.
- server.env.example documents the env surface.
- mempalace-server.service is a hardened systemd unit template.
Tests: TLS handshake (openssl-gated), read-only enforcement, token
autogen/0600/reuse, token-not-in-argv, secure-by-default gates.
Docs: remote-server guide now leads with `mempalace serve` plus Compose
and systemd subsections.
* test(serve): fix Windows — don't patch os.name; gate 0600 asserts to POSIX
Patching os.name to 'posix' broke Path.home() on Windows (pathlib mixed
POSIX home resolution with Windows drive parsing). Capture both exec
branches (os.execve + subprocess.run) instead, and guard the POSIX
permission-bit assertions behind os.name == 'posix' (Windows files
report 0o666).
The opt-in HTTP transport reuses the stdio dispatcher and binds loopback by
default, but /mcp was unauthenticated with no protection against a malicious
web page reaching a DNS-rebound localhost server, and its tests reached for
Starlette/uvicorn (not project deps) so they were silently skipped in CI —
the production _serve_http handler had zero coverage.
Hardening:
- Pin the Host header to loopback literals + the bound host on a loopback bind
(DNS-rebinding defense); relaxed for a deliberately non-loopback bind, which
is the operator's call and may sit behind a Host-rewriting proxy.
- Reject any browser Origin that isn't a loopback origin (rebinding/SSRF guard);
non-browser MCP clients omit Origin and are unaffected.
- Optional bearer token via MEMPALACE_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN (constant-time compare);
required on /mcp, never on /healthz so liveness probes work credential-free.
- Warn loudly when bound to a non-loopback host (palace reachable from network).
Testability:
- Split _build_http_server() out of _serve_http() so tests bind 127.0.0.1:0 and
drive the real handler over a loopback socket via stdlib http.client.
- Replace the skipped Starlette reimplementation with 12 tests covering dispatch,
initialize, /healthz, 404, parse-error, the 16 MiB cap, notification 202, and
the Host/Origin/token rejections — no third-party deps.