math_animate writes caller-supplied Python to scene.py and runs Manim on it —
arbitrary local code execution with no boundary surfaced in the tool contract.
In an agent-driven system the scene_code may be LLM-generated or influenced by
untrusted prompt content, so import-time code or construct() could read
secrets/SSH material, open network connections, or spawn subprocesses.
Add a static AST safety scan that rejects dangerous imports (os, subprocess,
socket, requests, ctypes, ...), dangerous builtins (eval/exec/compile/open/
__import__), and sandbox-escape dunders (__globals__, __subclasses__, ...)
before Manim runs. Genuine math scenes (manim, numpy, math, ...) pass
untouched. This is defense-in-depth, not a sandbox: a determined attacker can
evade a static denylist, so it is paired with an explicit allow_unsafe_code
opt-out and a tool contract (schema + side_effects) that names the boundary.
Closes#219