ECC/scripts/lib/loopback-guard.js

54 lines
1.6 KiB
JavaScript

'use strict';
/**
* Host/Origin gating for ECC's loopback HTTP servers (control pane, plan
* canvas). DNS rebinding can point an attacker-controlled hostname at
* 127.0.0.1, so every request must present a Host header from this
* allowlist before the server does any work.
*/
const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '[::1]', '::1']);
// Extract the hostname portion of an HTTP Host header value, stripping any
// port. Returns null when the header is missing or malformed.
function parseHostHeader(value) {
if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') return null;
const trimmed = value.trim();
if (!trimmed) return null;
const match = trimmed.match(/^(\[[^\]]+\]|[^:]+)(?::\d+)?$/);
if (!match) return null;
return match[1].toLowerCase();
}
function buildAllowedHostnames(configuredHost) {
const set = new Set(LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES);
if (configuredHost) set.add(String(configuredHost).toLowerCase());
return set;
}
function isAllowedHostHeader(hostHeader, allowedHostnames) {
const hostname = parseHostHeader(hostHeader);
if (!hostname) return false;
return allowedHostnames.has(hostname);
}
// Origin is absent on same-origin navigations and CLI clients; when present
// it must resolve to an allowed hostname.
function isAllowedOrigin(originHeader, allowedHostnames) {
if (!originHeader || typeof originHeader !== 'string') return true;
try {
const url = new URL(originHeader);
return allowedHostnames.has(url.hostname.toLowerCase());
} catch {
return false;
}
}
module.exports = {
LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES,
buildAllowedHostnames,
isAllowedHostHeader,
isAllowedOrigin,
parseHostHeader
};